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Abstract 
Martha C. Nussbaum, in her book Creating Capabilities- the Human Development Approach, 
describes her capabilities approach as both a theory of justice and a theory of welfare. In 
describing and critically reviewing the main arguments of Nussbaum’s approach, this paper 
attempts to answer the question: to what extent is the capabilities theory a theory of social 
justice? The main ideas under discussion are those presented in the core chapter of the book 
(chapter two); however, her ideas on global justice and political structures as presented in 
other chapters have also been referenced. 
The paper briefly explores the concept of social justice as presented by John Rawls and 
David Miller, and selectively applies the main arguments in the assessment of Nussbaum’s 
approach. A theory of social justice, the paper observes, should provide for both distributive 
justice and procedural justice. In examining how the two types of justice are applied, or 
should be applied, in the context of the capabilities approach, reference is also made to ideas 
presented by Thomas Pogge and Ingrid Robeyns.  
The paper reveals the strengths and limitation of Nussbaum’s capabilities theory as a theory 
of social justice. It further gives recommendations on how the limitations could be addressed 
to secure social justice; both at the national and global level.  
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Nussbaum’s Capability Approach 
Martha Nussbaum makes an argument for social justice as equality in human dignity. This 
dignity, she argues, can only be safeguarded if everyone enjoys ten central capabilities, at 
least at a minimum threshold.  
Nussbaum asserts that to understand what capabilities are, one has to begin with the question: 
what are people actually able to do and to be? This, she would argue, should not be confused 
with the question: what are people doing and being? Capabilities are, thus, essentially 
opportunities to do and to be, and not the action of doing or being in itself.  
She emphasises that capabilities should be understood as freedoms where individuals have 
the choice of whether or not to utilize the available capabilities. Freedom, she argues, has 
intrinsic value. If an individual chooses to realise the freedoms, then is it said that such 
freedoms or capabilities have been converted to functionings. Nussbaum argues that 
governments should not focus on ensuring functionalities but rather on providing capabilities. 
Accordingly, no individual should be forced to convert available capabilities to functionings.   
In clarifying what capabilities entails, Nussbaum calls for an understanding of capabilities as 
combined capabilities where internal capabilities are coupled with external capabilities- made 
up of the social, economic and political environment. The social environment entails social 
norms and culture; economic environment entails the economic policies and opportunities 
accruing from such policies; and the political environment entails the political institutions and 
political culture.  
When one of the components of the combined capabilities is unfulfilled then such freedoms 
are curtailed as it would be impossible to optimally convert the capabilities to functionings. 
For instance, if one has the ability to express political opinion but the freedom of political 
expression is curtailed in the prevailing political system then the capability of political 
expression cannot be converted to a functioning.  
Nussbaum argues that internal capabilities are fluid and are shaped by society through 
education and health among other practices, right from birth. It follows that a society can 
constrain capabilities by not facilitating the development of internal capabilities. The society, 
therefore, has the responsibility of securing both internal and external capabilities.  
Nussbaum describes her conception of capabilities as a foundation of social justice. She 
argues for a threshold of the combined capabilities, to which every individual is entitled. She 
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consequently advocates for treatment of all people with equal respect; every individual in 
essence is eligible for equal dignity.  
Ten capabilities are pointed out as the central capabilities, which every just society should 
inspire to provide to all its citizens at a specified minimum threshold. Applying the principle 
of political liberalism, she argues that the threshold-setting should be a national decision 
based on historical and cultural considerations.  
The determination of the central capabilities, Nussbaum argues, should not be left for 
decision through political process since they are so essential for a worthy life. They are 
based, she asserts, on sound argument and recognized world consensus. The central 
capabilities, according to Nussbaum, are: life; bodily health; bodily integrity; sense, 
imagination, and thought; emotions; practical reasoning; affiliation; other species; play; and 
control over one’s environment.  
Nussbaum asserts that the central capabilities are not hierarchical; all of them need to be 
pursued at the set minimum threshold for every individual. In case of competing capabilities, 
she argues for a tragic choice where one of the competing capabilities can be preferred over 
another on a case by case basis depending on the outcome of the pursuing one capability over 
another. Such tragic choices, she argues, should be addressed and avoided since all of the 
central capabilities are essential.  
Nussbaum stresses the role of political institutions in the enforcement of the central 
capabilities. She argues that capabilities should be adopted as political entitlements and 
provided for in constitutions. In the interpretation and implementation of the central 
capabilities, and oversight of the implementation, she calls for just and democratic political 
procedures and structures. 
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What is Social Justice? 
Social justice might mean different things to different people. Terms that have been used 
described the principles of social justice include equality, equity, needs, liberty, and respect1. 
I believe that it is important to explore the term and construct a concept to be applied in the 
assessment of Nussbaum’s capabilities approach as a theory of social justice. I will adapt 
social justice as conceived by John Rawls and David Miller2.  
Rawls argues for justice as fairness and asserts that social justice’s essence is to protect equal 
access to basic liberties, and opportunities for citizens. He emphasises that the least 
advantaged in society should be treated fairly. Rawls argues for equal basic liberties, but 
holds that social and economic inequality is justified as long as these inequalities are: to the 
greatest benefit of the most disadvantaged; or associated with positions that are open to 
everyone by equal opportunity. In coming up with the conception of justice as liberties and 
duties to be assigned to political institutions and individuals, he applies the contract theory 
where individuals (detached from individual bias) cooperate in the construction of principles 
of justice to be applied by the society.  
According to Miller, social justice has to do with the distribution of societal advantages and 
disadvantages. He asserts that the value of the benefits to be assigned should be established 
by the relevant population as a whole. He prefers an understanding of social justice as what is 
agreed by a society before knowing individual stakes in the decision. As such, he argues that 
social justice must not be a rationalization of individual interests. Miller’s theory is pegged 
on three principles of social justice: need, desert, and equality. Respectively, a just society 
would be one where: (1) no one is lacking basic necessities essential for functioning; (2) 
distribution of benefits is based on performance; and (3) every citizen in treated equally. 
Inequality is justified if it motivates people to strive and/or if it results from the principle 
desert.  
This paper will take a conception of social justice that incorporates two aspects of justice 
brought out by Rawls and Miller: distributive justice and procedural justice. Distributive 
justice answers the question of how rights and opportunities are allocated in society, while 
procedural justice looks at how the decisions- in the establishment of societal values- are 
made.  
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Capability Approach as a Theory of Justice 
Nussbaum has described her capability approach as a theory of justice and, in admitting to 
one of its limitations3, she describes it as a partial theory of social justice. This section 
critically reviews the arguments for the approach as a theory of justice. The concept of 
justice, I argue, is one that is based on fairness and equality in distribution and procedure.  
 
Distributive Justice 
On Equality and Equity 
Nussbaum’s capabilities approach is based on the individual as the end, with each individual 
entitled to a minimum threshold of central capabilities without which life would not be worth 
of dignity. This is based on the premise that every individual is entitled to equal dignity. 
Nussbaum believes that everyone should have access to the central freedoms regardless of the 
gender, age, social and economic class, religious beliefs, political opinion, among other 
divisions that could be manipulated for marginalization. Every individual is, hence, entitled 
to both internal capabilities and external capabilities that would allow for corresponding 
central functionings.  
Equal dignity in choice and ability to choose, which is at the heart of Nussbaum’s approach, I 
argue, is a foundation for a socially just society. What is exceptional about this approach is 
that it does not attach central opportunities to merit, position, potential for striving, or 
obligation accruing for being part of a society. Every person is entitled to a life worth of 
dignity by virtue of being human. 
Nussbaum does not give central focus on equity in her arguments. She, however, holds that in 
a situation of differential treatment involving an innately skilled individual and another 
individual lacking such skills, she would prefer better treatment to the latter. Although 
Nussbaum believes that basic capabilities should be equally nurtured, she argues that 
individuals with cognitive disabilities require more assistance to develop the central 
capabilities necessary to strive. The limited scope of equity in the distribution of the central 
capabilities, I argue, is a limitation to Nussbaum’s capabilities approach. For distribution of 
societal values to be fair, I argue, a broader and more inclusive conception of equity needs to 
be embraced. 
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Adapting Sens’ concept of conversion factors4, Robeyns lists three conversion factors 
essential for capabilities to be converted to functionings: personal conversion factors, social 
conversion factors, and environmental conversion factors. Although these conversion factors 
appear to be similar to what Nussbaum refers to as combined capabilities, they broaden the 
view on what could hinder equal access to capabilities. Robeyns’ personal conversion factors, 
for instance, also include characteristics that innately differentiate one person from another 
such as intelligence and sex. The social conversion factors resemble Nussbaum’s capabilities 
accruing from the social, economic, and political environment. Robeyns introduces the 
environmental conversion factors as those that include geographical location and climate. 
These additional considerations (environmental conversion factors and innate abilities), I 
argue, need to be adequately addressed to allow for a better understanding of the capabilities 
available to every individual. 
Nussbaum argues that internal capabilities are fluid elements of a person and that they are 
“not hard-wired into our DNA”5. Although she implicitly admits to the possibility of innate 
skills, she holds that the development of basic skills is determined by external factors. 
However, it should be noted that there are innate personal characteristics that affect the level 
and speed at which personal capabilities are developed. This would explain why two students 
in the same class with the same dream career, level of motivation, effort, education, and 
teachers’ attention might not achieve the same level of success in their pursuit.  
I hold that in the nurturing of internal capabilities, more attention should be given to 
individuals with lower innate abilities. More teaching attention should be given to those with 
difficulty in understanding basic concepts and more physical health care should be availed for 
those with physical disability or difficulty. In addition, I believe, those who live in 
disadvantageous climatic and geographical conditions require additional attention to 
overcome such disadvantage and enjoy equal opportunity. For instance, people living in 
earth-quake prone areas or regions experiencing severe consequences of climate change 
might fail to strive as they would otherwise have because of fear or deteriorating 
opportunities, respectively. In such cases, a socially just society would concentrate on 
disaster management mechanisms that would settle fear and ensure sustainable availability of 
capabilities. 
Nussbaum’s capability approach, I argue, also fails to address past social injustices. For a 
society to transition from an unjust one to one that embraces justice as set out by the 
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capability approach, it would have to ensure that the disadvantages accrued by the 
marginalized individuals are first offset. Individuals are in many situations marginalized due 
to their association with a particular gender, religion, race, and/or ethnicity among other 
affiliations. In such situations group rights could be assigned to the extent that it offsets 
disadvantages that would hinder equal opportunity. For instance, an ethnic group that had 
previously been denied educational and economic opportunity, might require a quota for such 
opportunities for its members to enjoy similar opportunities as other citizens. If another 
community was previous deprived of property rights in the form of communal land, such 
rights would need to be assigned as group rights. Nussbaum dismisses group rights although 
admitting, in passing, to the benefits of affirmation action when directed towards creating 
individual capabilities. She fails to acknowledge the great potential of group rights in 
addressing past injustices and assisting societies to come to a full realization of equal 
capabilities.  
I argue that group rights should be a central consideration for transitioning societies to reduce 
the disadvantages of the marginalized groups to a level that would avail them equal 
capabilities. Such group rights, I assert, should be assigned equitably within the group. Some 
individuals within the previously-marginalized groups might have been more marginalized 
than others hence the need to pay attention to different needs even within the groups.  
I argue for what I call negative equity6, where the disadvantaged in the society are treated 
better and proportionately to their disadvantages to the level where equal dignity can be 
enjoyed as the minimum threshold of the central capabilities. This is in contrast to positive 
equity7 where more attention and capabilities would be awarded to those who are innately 
skilled and with more internal capabilities. Although Miller argues for desert as one of the 
principles of justice, I agree with Nussbaum in asserting that such positive equity could be 
detrimental to equal dignity; especially if applied below the threshold level. In addressing the 
problem of competing principles of justice, needs and desert, Miller asserts that in some 
situations desert could be chosen over needs where those in need are not deserving. Can a 
society that distributes the central capabilities based on merits qualify as a socially just one? 
In the final analysis, I argue, that a balanced application of both equality and equity in the 
achievement of equal dignity at the minimum threshold is crucial.   
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On Outcomes 
Nussbaum’s capability approach is based on securing capabilities as freedoms and not 
functionings. She asserts that a just society should not require its citizens to realize 
capabilities but rather should ensure the availability of such capabilities to its citizens. It 
follows that the citizens would then have the freedom consider which capabilities to pursue, 
if any at all. She, however, admits that functionings are the end to striving for capabilities 
since capabilities would not be useful if they are never utilized. She even notes that if internal 
capabilities are not realized, they could be lost. Although Nussbaum acknowledges the 
importance of functionings, she fails to acknowledge the flip side; where functionings or the 
outcomes of the capabilities could be detrimental to equal dignity.  
Imagine that one part of a population decides not to seek medical health care because its 
members’ religious beliefs do not support practice of scientific medicine. Nussbaum might 
argue that the individuals are enjoying equal dignity by having the choice of not seeking 
medical care as long as that option is open for them. A closer look at the outcome of this 
freedom will reveal the importance of considering whether the outcomes of capabilities are 
just. The individuals, belonging to this particular religious group, who choose not to realise 
the functionality of bodily health might consequently not be able to live a normal length of 
human life due to body ailments that could have otherwise been treated using modern 
medicine. This would be in contrast to other parts of the population where individuals are 
healthy and have a considerably higher life expectancy. The unrestricted freedoms on central 
capabilities, I argue, could translate to life choices that contradict equal dignity.   
What if this population does not also believe in modern education and participation in 
political process? Individuals in this population might not develop internal capabilities 
necessary for a rational conversion of the central capabilities to functionalities; this is 
particularly detrimental to the capability of practical reasoning. The same individuals would 
also not have the ability to control their environment, or to choose to do so, by influencing 
societal decision making that would affect their lives. As Nussbaum notes on the loss of 
capabilities if not realized, these individuals would lose the internal capabilities associated 
with realizing other central capabilities not supported by their religion. 
I argue that a society cannot boast of securing equal dignity if some parts of its population do 
not realize the most central capabilities even if they are made available to all citizens. As 
illustrated above, the realm of central freedoms can turn into a vicious cycle of incapabilities 
that might affect one part of society more than the rest. This would visibly translate to 
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societal inequality in the ability to realise lives worth of dignity. I agree with Nussbaum’s 
rationale for having capabilities as individual freedoms, to cater for the diversity and to 
enable striving. I, however, argue that for the central capabilities to translate to a life of equal 
dignity, the minimum thresholds for the most central capabilities need to be guaranteed as 
functionalities.  
When addressing the issue to tragic choice, Nussbaum admits that although there is no 
hierarchy in the list of central capabilities, it is possible to advance one capability over 
another depending on the outcome. In adapting Wolff’s and De-Shalit’s concepts of fertile 
functioning and corrosive disadvantage, Nussbaum argues that in a tragic choice situation 
priority should be given those central capabilities that have the effect of enhancing other 
capabilities. I argue that the same logic should be applied in determining which central 
capabilities should be enforced as functionalities at the minimum threshold level. I assert that 
those capabilities which have corrosive disadvantage if not realized should take precedence in 
this case. This, I argue, is because if such capabilities are not secured, their absence would 
make one or more of the other capabilities inaccessible hence having the potential of reducing 
the dignity of life. Capabilities with fertile functioning, on the other hand, can only enhance 
other capabilities hence do not negatively affect the dignity of life set as the minimum 
threshold of central capabilities.  
I also argue that in considering which capabilities should be enforced as functionings, the 
issue of individual responsibility in upholding equal dignity needs to be addressed. Nussbaum 
notes that an individual should not be given the freedom of being treated disrespectfully. I 
argue, that an individual should also not be given the choice of treating others disrespectfully. 
This, therefore calls, for the need to require functionality in the form of individual 
responsibility in upholding equal dignity.  
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Beyond the Threshold 
Nussbaum is very clear on how equal dignity should be enforced to the minimum threshold 
of the central capabilities. She, however, does not give clear direction on how the principle of 
equal dignity can be applied in the distribution questions beyond the threshold level. 
Nussbaum, nonetheless, gives examples where unequal distribution beyond the minimum 
threshold would translate to unequal dignity to some individuals or groups in a society. The 
distribution of voting rights and religious freedoms, for instance, would result in unequal 
dignity if some groups get more voting quota or number of days of worship compared to 
other groups. Other central capabilities such as bodily health if availed to one group more 
than another, even if both groups attain the minimum threshold, would hurt the dignity of the 
disfavoured group. Nussbaum admits to the difficulty of determining how unequal 
distribution of material conditions would affect human dignity.  
I agree with Nussbaum’s assessment that discriminatory allocation of capabilities might 
warrant equal distribution even beyond the threshold. This, I argue, should hold for both 
political entitlements and material conditions. It would not be correct to call a society just if it 
provides better housing to those belonging to the leader’s ethnic group even though the 
socially accepted minimum housing is availed to everyone.  
Beyond the threshold, I argue, positive equity could be applied. In which case, individuals 
who realize available capabilities by converting them to functionings are afforded more 
capabilities. I propose a desert system where benefits are gained as a result of achieved 
outcomes; such benefits should be limited to material conditions. As illustrated above, 
unequal distribution of political entitlements, even through a fair merit system, would be 
detrimental to equal dignity. If an individual pursues a musical career by choosing to realize 
the central capabilities essential for the development of her/his musical skills, such skills 
should be rewarded by provision of capabilities for further development of such skills. In this 
instance, this could mean those with superior musical skills be rewarded by scholarships to an 
advanced music school. Although this reward system would produce elites8 in the various 
career spaces in society, I argue that this distribution of capabilities is fair as long as everyone 
has the central capabilities to start with and hence equal chances of attaining the elite status. 
This system would work as long as the equal minimum threshold is not jeopardized for the 
benefit of the elites. 
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In another scenario, I argue that a business woman who extensively utilizes the available 
central capabilities to set up a flourishing business, should benefit from more profits than her 
counterparts who were unable to reach the same level of achievement given the same central 
capacities. However, should this business woman be allowed to have monopoly power if she 
uses her profits to grow her business into a billion-dollar empire with unmatched capacities to 
compete in a particular market niche?  
The questions we must ask in attempting to address distribution issues beyond the threshold 
are: (1) whether the equal minimum threshold is enough, and (2) to what degree socio-
economic inequality should be acceptable beyond the threshold. In some situations the 
minimum threshold might not seem enough if the difference between capabilities at the 
threshold and those enjoyed by the elite is enormous. In such situations, I argue, a society 
should increase the minimum threshold to reduce this capability gap9. I argue that these 
questions should be constantly reflected upon by societies aspiring for social justice, and 
adjustments on the threshold enforced accordingly. In doing so, I assert, any new threshold 
should not be set lower than the preceding threshold as this would be synonymous to 
reducing the human dignity required at minimum. However, if a threshold reduction is crucial 
for equality at the threshold to be sustained, for fairness, such a reduction should be 
accompanied by an equivalent reduction of capabilities that would have been availed as 
desert.  
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On Global Justice 
Nussbaum argues that the central capabilities are so critical that they entail human 
entitlement. This argument denotes the global nature of such capabilities. Nussbaum 
struggles with the question of whether the minimum threshold of enforced capabilities should 
be the same for every country. While she believes that every country should set its own 
threshold in consideration of history and traditions, she acknowledges the different economic 
endowments that would come to play in setting such a threshold. A country in sub-Saharan 
Africa, for instance, would most likely set a lower threshold than a country in Western 
Europe. As Nussbaum recommended, the threshold should be aspirational but not utopian; a 
country can only set the threshold to a level it would be able to provide in case every citizen 
chooses to realize all the ten capabilities, as listed by Nussbaum as being essential for a 
dignified life.  
Nussbaum defines capabilities as political entitlements and hence their safeguard is the 
responsibility of political institutions. She argues that the responsibility of providing the 
central capabilities falls squarely on national governments. Given that there is no world 
government, she notes, it would be impossible to have the same threshold enforced by a 
central institution. Holding onto the concept of political liberalism, Nussbaum argues that it 
would be too dictatorial to oblige rich nations to transfer resources required to secure central 
capabilities in poor nations. This follows, therefore, poor nations should primarily set lower 
minimum threshold as compared to the rich nations.  
Is it just, however, for an individual to have access to a lower minimum threshold of central 
capabilities, and consequently life of lower dignity, just by virtue of being born in a poor 
nation? Shouldn’t the minimum threshold for a life worth of dignity be set without 
consideration of the resource considerations? Isn’t availing different levels of human dignity 
according to resource endowment similar to pegging dignity to money? 
In her core chapter, Nussbaum makes a number of arguments in trying to address the question 
of securing human dignity in poor nations. First, she states that the whole world has the 
obligation to secure central capabilities to all world citizens. Second, she advocates for rich 
nations to assist poor nations. Third, she notes that world institutions that have produced 
global injustices need to be changed.  
Nussbaum’s passing statements, nonetheless, leave more questions than answers at this stage. 
How should the obligation of securing central capabilities in poor nations be divided among 
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world actors? Should rich nations assist poor countries as a matter of philanthropy or as a 
given responsibility? How should the current global institutions be organized to address 
global injustices and how would such a change contribute to access to more resources for the 
poor nations? Nussbaum expounds her statements for global justice in the sixth chapter of her 
book.  
Contrary to her earlier argument on resource transfer, she holds that rich nations ought to give 
poor nations at least 2% of their GDP. She continues to argue that multinational companies, 
non-governmental organizations, and government agencies ought to contribute to the 
provision of central capabilities wherever they operate. Although emphasising the importance 
of global institutions in solving global injustice, Nussbaum remains vague on how the change 
of global institutions should take place. Apart from mentioning the potential role of 
international institutions in imposing common norms, her arguments revolve around how 
states ought to intervene, or not depending on scenario, to secure central capabilities in poor 
nations.  Nussbaum observes that the world is fluid hence making it difficult to assign 
permanent responsibilities and consequently unable to attain ‘capability security’10. She 
argues that while this is a challenge, the responsibilities of world actors should be left 
tentative to allow for adaptation as the world community changes.  
While Nussbaum has attempted to address the issue of global justice, I argue, her arguments 
fall short by not adequately examining the potential role of global institutions in availing 
resources required by poor nations to secure central capabilities. Although indeed the world 
community is fluid, global institutions (and particularly inter-governmental organizations) are 
more stable than unstable. I argue, that for the time such institutions have command over 
global resources, they should ensure fair distribution of such resources to poor nations.  
In scrutinising the problem of global justice, Pogge examines the roles of positive and 
negative duties in the pursuit of global justice. When applied to the capability approach, 
Pogge would argue that positive duties would entail rich nations providing the means for poor 
countries to secure central capabilities for their citizens. Negative duties would entail rich 
nations ensuring that they do not hinder poor nations from achieving central capabilities. 
Nussbaum focuses on positive duties by arguing for transfer of a portion of GDP to poor 
nations, and for other world actors to assist in their various capacities towards securing 
central capabilities in poor nations. I argue that promoting negative duties is more important. 
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The current global institutions, as Nussbaum observed, result in global injustices that 
translate to unequal access to central capabilities hence denying poor nations the ability to 
secure central capabilities. These global injustices, as correctly observed by Pogge, result 
from global institutions which essentially serve the interests of rich nations. Since poor 
nations cannot exit from these institutions because of the intricate nature of globalization, 
they continue to suffer injustices without any significant negotiating power. It can be argued, 
therefore, that it is rich nations that essentially harm poor nations’ ability to secure central 
capabilities.  
Rather than focussing on transfer of resources, I argue, rich nations should apply the principle 
of negative duties by working towards correcting the institutions that are result in unfair 
distribution of global resources. For instance, rather than committing their GDP to global aid 
annually, rich nations should focus their efforts in the negotiation of a fair system of 
international trade that would give poor nations access to markets for their products. I hold 
that this would be a more sustainable way of securing central capabilities in poor nations; this 
would bring ‘capability security’ closer to realization.  
I acknowledge that the urgency of securing the central capabilities might not be matched by 
the potentially slow process of negotiating a new global order. I argue for positive duties in 
securing the central capabilities at the minimum threshold in the short-run. Positive duties 
such as aid, I assert, should be conditioned first to the enforcement of functionality of the 
most central capabilities then to the provision of other central capabilities. This should, 
however, not distract the efforts of negative duties. The positive duties should incrementally 
be replaced by sustainable means to secure central capabilities, at least to the minimum 
threshold.  
Reflecting back on setting of the threshold, I argue that such a decision should be made 
without consideration of resource availability but rather in consideration of history and way 
of life. I argue that if the minimum threshold is chosen without fear of resource scarcity, then 
the assessed threshold suffices as criteria for a life worth of dignity. A just global order, 
therefore, is what will ensure equal dignity for all the world citizens in the long run. 
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Procedural Justice 
Both Rawls and Miller believe that in a just society, the principles that apply to all members 
of the society should be decided on through a rational process; one that is not driven by 
individualistic interests. It follows that the decisions made should be for the good of the 
society as a whole and not for the good of few individuals. In addition to rationality, both 
authors agree, such a process also ought to include the individuals who would be bound by 
the societal principles. Nussbaum’s capabilities approach is rational in its logical support for 
the list of ten central capabilities. It, nonetheless, falls short in securing procedural justice due 
to its lack of inclusiveness.  
Beyond the benevolent dictator  
Nussbaum emphasises that the central capabilities are so essential that they should not be 
subject to a political process. This assertion is based on legitimate fear of negative 
politicization of provisions as essential as the central capabilities. However, since citizens can 
only be involved in societal decision making through a political process, the assertion implies 
exclusion of the same citizen who would be beneficiaries of such capabilities. Would it be 
just for individuals to be bound by universal values that they did not have a voice in 
choosing? What if some capabilities considered crucial for human dignity by some 
individuals are not guaranteed in the list of capabilities to be included in their constitution? 
Throughout her book, Nussbaum supports freedom of choice and defines capabilities as 
individual freedoms. She also includes in her list of central capabilities, the capability of 
control over one’s environment. Nussbaum, however, fails to take into consideration 
individual freedoms in the construction of her central-capabilities list. Her argument that the 
political goal of all humans ought to be the same, negates the individual’s freedom approach 
that she seems to support.  
The central capabilities are based on the concept of human dignity, a concept that Nussbaum 
argues has achieved world consensus. While this might be the case, this concept- as she 
rightly points out- is intuitive and vague, and needs to be assessed in relation to other 
concepts. It would follow, therefore, that the central capabilities are a result of such an 
assessment. The value system adopted by Nussbaum, she argues, is not based on people’s 
preference but on sound argument- observed as the assessment of the concept of human 
dignity. It is, however, clear that only her argument was considered in the value judgment. By 
asserting the value of human dignity as universal, she becomes the benevolent dictator when 
she makes a list of capabilities that every human should be entitled to and that every society 
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should aspire to provide to its citizens. I argue that consensus should be the reference point in 
the design of the central capabilities just as it has been in establishing the paramountcy of 
human dignity. If the concept of human dignity has a world-wide consensus as Nussbaum 
asserts, I believe that the central capabilities adapted by a just society would most likely 
resemble Nussbaum’s list. 
I argue that inclusion would not only promote ownership in the definition of a life worth of 
dignity but it would also ensure sustainable implementation of such capabilities. Nussbaum 
emphasises the need to include the central capabilities in constitutions as entitlements that 
should be safeguarded through an inclusive political structure that allows from popular 
oversight. While this might be necessary for capability security, manipulation of political 
institutions that could impede the central capabilities would be less likely to occur if such 
capabilities resulted from a general agreement. Individuals, having actively participated in the 
decision-making process, would be keen in ensuring the implementation of their entitlements. 
The government would also be more willing to implement a decision they facilitated in 
making.  
A Just Decision 
In addressing the problem of how both inclusion and rationality can be achieved in decision 
making, I adopt the concept of social cooperation as conceived by Rawls.  
Rawls argues for a conception of justice where the principles of justice are determined by 
fairness in decision making through social cooperation. In explaining how this social 
cooperation is possible in a diverse community of people, he introduces the concept of the 
original position. At this position, individuals forgo their biased interests and rationally 
negotiate to come up with a societal conception of justice. I argue that a guarantee of secured 
central capabilities for all in the society would allow for this rational social cooperation.  
Rawls argues that creating condition of fairness in the procedure empowers individuals to 
advance the interests of equals. Although I would advocate for a non-majoritarian democratic 
process- as Nussbaum envisages as a guarantee for the capabilities- I believe, a construction 
of such a process needs to be done in consideration of national history and traditions.  
I agree with Rawls assertion that consensus on the societal values should not be fixed but 
should be viewed as a relative equilibrium that is adjustable. The central capabilities should, 
hence, be continuously examined from the original position as established through a fair 
process.   
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Conclusion  
In conclusion, I would argue that Nussbaum’s capability approach is indeed a partial theory 
of justice. The strength of the approach lies in its concept of equal dignity as equal access to 
the central capabilities at the minimum threshold. The approach falls short by not adequately 
acknowledging the role of equity in promoting social justice. In addition, by not considering 
the outcomes of capabilities availed to individuals, it fails to observe the potential of 
functionings in contradicting equal dignity. Another weakness that present a missed 
opportunity is on how Nussbaum addresses global injustices.  
The paper establishes that both distributive and procedural justice are important. While the 
capabilities approach does not adequately provide for distributive justice, as described above, 
it completely fails to secure procedural justice in the construction of the central capabilities.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
19 
 
Bibliography 
Core reference 
Nussbaum, M.C. (2011). Creating Capabilities. The Human development approach. Harvard
  University Press.  
Further reference 
Miller, D. (2000). Principles of Social Justice. Harvard University Press. Cambridge.  
Pogge, T. (2010). Politics as usual. What lies behind the pro-poor rhetoric. Polity.
 Cambridge. 
Rawls, J. (1999). A theory of justice. Revised edition. The Belknap press of Harvard       
  University press. Cambridge, Massachusetts.  
Robeyns, I. (2005). The Capability Approach: A Theoretical Survey. Journal of Human   
  Development, 6, 1, 93–114. 
 
 
1 Jost, J.T., & Kay, A.C. (2010). Social Justice: History, Theory, and Research. Handbook of Social Psychology,
 3, III, 30. 
2 John Rawls’ and David Miller’s arguments were chosen for this paper because the two are contemporary 
 political philosophers and theorists who have dedicated many years to the study the concept of justice.  
 Although their arguments differ, their conception of justice draw from the same roots. Their theories are 
 similar to Nussbaum’s in that they also believe in central provisions that should be guaranteed in a just  
 society.  
3 Nussbaum admits that her capability approach has not addressed distribution problems above the threshold. 
 Nussbaum, M.C. (2011, p.40) 
4 In his capability theory, Sens argues that for one to understand people’s welfare, one should not look at their 
 income but at their ability to convert the income into welfare. He argues for an understanding of what he 
 coined as the ‘conversion factors’.  
5 Nussbaum implies that it is common knowledge that basic capabilities are not hard-wired in the DNA.  
 Nussbaum, M.C. (2011, p.23) 
6 The logic behind the terminology ‘negative equity’ derives from its effect; it prevents disadvantages from 
 negatively affecting the ability to enjoy combined capabilities.  
7 ‘Positive equity’ has the opposite effect of ‘negative equity’; it enhances the enjoyment of capabilities for 
 those with advantages. 
8 ‘Elite’ has been used to connote individuals with superior capabilities, and not necessarily those enjoying 
 financial abundance.  
9 ‘Capability gap’ as used in this paper refers to difference in available capabilities at the minimum threshold 
 and the capabilities enjoyed by the elites.  
10 ‘Capability security’ as described by Nussbaum is the assurance of future availability of the central   
 capabilities.  
                                                 
